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Product-Service Systems (PSSs) constitute a family of service-based business models designed to satisfy
our societal needs in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner. To date however PSS
application has remained niche due to a variety of critical barriers. This paper explores how ‘demand
pull’ national government policies could support PSS activity by addressing these barriers and cultivating
market demand. Lessons are drawn from a case study of how regulatory, economic incentive, informative
and procurement policies have supported Energy Service Company (ESCo) activity in the UK; a sub-set of
the PSS family focused on energy service provision. Subsequently ﬁve policy recommendations are
presented to support PSS activity: (1) balancing economic incentives and regulatory disincentives; (2)
promoting indirect policy support; (3) redesigning existing market structures; (4) promoting locally-led
PSS activity; and (5) creating stable policy frameworks. The paper warns however that national gov-
ernment policy cannot easily address all PSS barriers, such as customer preferences, international de-
velopments, technological progress and inherent business model weaknesses, pointing to the need for
other complementary solutions. Furthermore, other governance actors beside national government could
also implement PSS supporting policies.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There are growing concerns that many of the business models
and underpinning socio-technical systems we rely on to satisfy our
basic human needs are environmentally unsustainable, raising
questions about their degree of functionality in the future. Conse-
quently, there are calls to develop and implement novel business
models capable of satisfying societal needs in a sustainable fashion
(Boons et al., 2013; Lee and Casalegno, 2010; Wilson et al., 2009), a
step considered as critical by some scholars to driving wider tran-
sitions for sustainable development (Hannon et al., 2013; Loorbach
et al., 2010).
One group of business models that has received particular
attention in this regard over recent years are known as Product-
Service Systems (PSSs) (Roy, 2000; Mont, 2002; Maxwell and van
der Vorst, 2003; Mont and Tukker, 2006; Tukker et al., 2004;
Tukker, 2004; Tukker and Tischner, 2006; Stahel, 2007; Tukkernnon).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleet al., 2008; Hansen et al., 2009; Hannon, 2012; Boons et al.,
2013; Loorbach and Wijsman, 2013). PSS businesses strive to pre-
sent value propositions that simultaneously meet economic,
ecological and social needs (Wilson et al., 2009; Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund, 2013) by focusing on the ﬁnal functionality or satisfaction
that the consumer desires (Tukker and Tischner, 2006). Despite the
wide range of beneﬁts these models could provide, ‘the adoption of
such business strategies is still very limited because it often in-
volves signiﬁcant corporate, cultural and regulatory barriers’
(Ceschin, 2013 p.74). Consequently, research has explored the bar-
riers responsible for constraining the application of PSS models and
the types of government policy interventions that could help to
promote PSS activity (Mont and Lindhqvist, 2003; Ceschin and
Vezzoli, 2010; Tukker et al., 2008).
This paper examines how ‘demand pull’ government policies
might cultivate a greater demand PSS activity. It draws lessons from
43 interviews focused on one case of PSS activity in particular:
Energy Service Company (ESCo) operation in the UK. The ESCo
model is centred around providing customers with the physical
beneﬁt, utility or good that people derive from energy, referred to
as energy services (EU, 2006). It has been identiﬁed as a potentiallyunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 A detailed breakdown of the core characteristics of the ESCo model can be
found in both Hannon (2012) and Hannon et al. (2013).
2 Production costs in this context refer to those incurred for the purchase of
material inputs that create energy services. These include conversion, distribution
and control equipment; as well as energy commodities (i.e. fuel & electricity)
(Sorrell, 2007).
3 Electronic or other controls monitor and control the ﬂow of energy from con-
version to consumption (e.g. thermostat) (Sorrell, 2007).
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could help to address the mounting challenges of climate change,
energy security and affordability, which are facing the international
energy community (Vine, 2005; Fawkes, 2007; Hansen, 2009;
Marino et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2012). This policy analysis is
timely considering the details of the recent European Energy Efﬁ-
ciency Directive, which obligates member states to remove any
regulatory and non-regulatory barriers that might impede the
uptake of energy service contracting (EU, 2012). The paper builds
on the authors' previous work that has analysed the coevolution of
the ESCo model in the UK with other business models, technolo-
gies, institutions and user practices (Hannon et al., 2013), by
examining in much greater depth how government policy can
improve the prospects for ESCo activity.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 examines the core
characteristics of PSS and ESCo models, the barriers they face, po-
tential policy solutions and opportunities for further research.
Section 3 outlines the paper's research methodology. Section 4
presents the results from the paper's empirical investigation, out-
lining how existing, emerging and possible government policies
could support UK ESCo activity. Section 5 draws a number of les-
sons from the empirical work that could help to support PSS ac-
tivity more broadly. Section 6 presents conclusions from the paper.
2. Key characteristics of PSS and ESComodels and the barriers
to their uptake
This section brieﬂy introduces the interrelated concepts of
sustainable business models, PSSs and ESCos, highlighting their
core characteristics, potential beneﬁts, barriers to uptake and
associated ‘demand pull’ government policy solutions. It concludes
by identifying some opportunities for further research this paper
aims to contribute towards.
2.1. Sustainable business models, PSSs and ESCos
2.1.1. PSSs as a sub-set of sustainable business models
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) deﬁne a business model as the
rationale of how an organization creates, delivers and captures
value by fulﬁlling the needs or desires of its customers. Extending
this logic a business operating a sustainable business model is one
seeking ‘to deliver economic, social and environmental beneﬁts…
through core business activities’ (Wilson et al., 2009 p.1). A PSS
constitutes a sub-set of sustainable business models in the sense
that it is a system of products, services, networks of players and
supporting infrastructure (Goedkoop et al., 1999) designed to
deliver value propositions that simultaneously meet economic,
ecological and social needs (Wilson et al., 2009; Boons and Lüdeke-
Freund, 2013) by focusing on the ﬁnal functionality or satisfaction a
consumer desires (Tukker and Tischner, 2006).
Three broad classes of PSS exist: product-, use- and result-ori-
ented models (Tukker and Tischner, 2006). Product-oriented PSSs
constitute the most basic form of PSS where the provider extends
its traditional product-based offer with additional services such as
maintenance, take-back and ﬁnancing schemes. Use-oriented PSSs
focus on providing the use or function of a product rather than just
the product itself. These models often take the form of renting or
leasing strategies and may involve sharing or pooling on the cus-
tomers' side. Result-oriented PSSs contractually guarantee the
satisfaction of the customer's needs to a certain level for a pre-
determined period of time. This model is considered to possess
the greatest potential environmental beneﬁt of the three but is also
potentially the hardest to implement by product-oriented busi-
nesses given how characteristically different it is from their core
business.2.1.2. ESCos as a sub-set of PSSs
In the sameway that the car-sharing businessmodel represents an
automotive subset of the PSS family (Firnkorn and Müller, 2012), the
ESCo model represents an energy subset. ESCos provide their cus-
tomers with the physical beneﬁt, utility or good that consumers
derive from energy, which are typically referred to as energy services
(EU, 2006). ESCos provide energy services to their customers via en-
ergy service contracts,which constitute ‘the transfer of decision rights
over key items of energy equipment under the terms and conditions
of a long-termcontract, including incentives tomaintain and improve
equipment performance over time’ (Sorrell, 2005 p.96). Importantly,
ESCos operate in a fundamentally different way to themore common
Energy Utility Company model, which is predicated on the sale of
units of fuel (e.g. gas, oil) or electricity. Unlike ESCos, the EnergyUtility
model dictates that it is the customer who is ultimately responsible
for converting these units of energy into the energy services that they
desire not the supplier (Hannon et al., 2013).1
Energy service contracts fall into two broad categories: energy
supply contracting and energy performance contracting (Fig. 1). An
energy supply contract (ESC) represents a type of use-oriented PSS
model. Here an ESCo provides useful energy streams to its cus-
tomers, which Sorrell (2007) deﬁnes as energy streams that have
already been converted by primary conversion equipment (e.g. a
boiler or CHP plant), such as hot water, coolant and electricity. Here
the customer is usually charged per unit of useful energy (Sorrell,
2007) or a ﬁxed price for the supply of a pre-determined level of
energy service (Marino et al., 2011). ESCos take control over the
primary conversion equipment necessary to generate these useful
energy services in an ESC. This control provides the ESCo with the
opportunity to reduce its customer's consumption of delivered en-
ergy (i.e. imported fuel or electricity), predominantly by improving
the technical and operational efﬁciency of its primary conversion
equipment (Sorrell, 2007), which in turn helps to reduce the pro-
duction costs2 associated with fulﬁlling its customer's energy
needs. However, even though ESCs may provide a reduction in ﬁnal
energy consumption, the ESCo does not normally guarantee these
savings as part of an ESC because ‘it lacks control over both the
efﬁciency of secondary conversion equipment and the demand for
ﬁnal energy services’ (Sorrell, 2005 p.17).
An energy performance contract (EPC) represents a type of result-
oriented PSS model considering that customers are provided with
ﬁnal energy services (e.g. lighting, heating, motive power). These
represent energy streams that have been converted by secondary
conversion equipment (e.g. radiators or ﬂuorescent lighting) and
can thus be enjoyed directly by customers, without the need for
additional conversion processes (Sorrell, 2005, 2007). Here the
ESCo assumes control over the secondary conversion equipment, as
well as the distribution (e.g. hotwater pipes) and associated control
equipment (e.g. thermostats, light sensors).3 As part of an EPC, the
ESCo also controls primary conversion equipment, affording it even
greater overall control over the quantity of energy required to
satisfy its customer's needs (Sorrell, 2007). This high degree of
control over the consumer's energy demand means that energy
performance guarantees are typically included as part of an EPC,
often in the form of a reduction in ﬁnal energy consumption, which
normally translates into a cost saving.
Fig. 1. Typical ‘work space’ of Energy Utilities and ESCos (adapted from Sorrell, 2007).
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illustrate the differences between these two types of ESCo contracts
(ESCs and EPCs) compared to a typical Energy Utility offering, i.e.
unit of gas. Functionality is highest at the right hand side of the
diagramwhere gas has been converted into the energy services the
consumer ultimately desires.4 Transaction costs refer to those associated with organising (or ‘governing’) the
provision of those streams and/or services, e.g. negotiating and writing the contract
(Sorrell, 2007).2.2. Barriers to PSS and ESCo application
This section outlines the key barriers to both PSS and ESCo ac-
tivity, beginning with the former:
1. Cultural status attached to product ownership: Traditional
culture inmany societies often attaches status to the purchasing,
ownership and control of products rather than services
(Goedkoop et al., 1999; Manzini et al., 2001; James and
Hopkinson, 2002; UNEP, 2002; Behrendt et al., 2003; Rexfelt
and Orn€as, 2009; Steinberger et al., 2009; Geng et al., 2010;
Ceschin, 2013).
2. Organisational inertia: Wholesale cultural and organisational
changes are often required from product-oriented companies in
order practice PSS models (Stoughton et al., 1998; UNEP, 2002;
Wolf et al., 2009; Ceschin, 2013).
3. Proﬁtability of existing business models: Many ﬁrms are
ﬁnancially successful in their current form and thus reticent to
overhaul their existing, product-based business model or wider
environment (Mont, 2002, 2004; Charter et al., 2008; Ceschin,
2013).
4. Difﬁcult to quantify savings: PSS ﬁrms often struggle to
quantify the economic and environmental savings/beneﬁts
arising from their services (UNEP, 2002; Ceschin, 2013).
5. Lack of a supportive regulatory framework: Government
policy typically fails to internalise environmental impacts and
reward sustainable business activity (Mont and Lindhqvist,
2003; Charter et al., 2008; COWI, 2008; Steinberger et al.,
2009; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010).6. Lack of awareness and understanding: Consumers and pro-
viders may be unaware of PSSs or fail to fully understand how
they work, the latter potentially leading to mistrust in these
models (White et al., 1999; Charter et al., 2008; COWI, 2008;
Steinberger et al., 2009; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010).
As a subset of the PSS family many of the barriers affecting PSS
uptake listed here also impede ESCo activity. For example, a lack of
reliable energy consumption data from consumers makes it difﬁ-
cult to accurately quantify potential and actual energy savings
delivered by ESCos (Sorrell, 2005; Bleyl-Androschin, 2011; Marino
et al., 2011). Additionally, a generally unsupportive regulatory
framework has also hindered ESCo activity. Speciﬁc examples
include complex, costly and time consuming public procurement
frameworks (Smith, 2007; Sorrell, 2007; Marino et al., 2011). More
broadly, the ambiguity and complexity of energy regulatory
frameworks has made energy service contracting challenging
(Marino et al., 2011). Finally, poor levels of awareness and under-
standing amongst potential customers and/or adopters of the ESCo
model has also served to limit demand for energy service contracts
(Sorrell, 2005; Steinberger et al., 2009; Hansen, 2011; Marino et al.,
2011).
Taking the opposite view there are some ESCo barriers that may
have relevance to other kinds of PSS model. For example, ESCos
have suffered from a lack of investment capital to cover the high
upfront costs incurred by ESCos, following the ﬁnancial crisis and
economic downturn (Vine, 2005; Hansen, 2011; Marino et al.,
2011). Additionally, a lack of standardised energy service con-
tracts havemeant that ESCos typically spend signiﬁcant amounts of
time and money drafting contracts from new, consequently
increasing their transaction costs4 (Vine, 2005; Marino et al., 2011).
Finally, a hostile response from incumbent energy companies
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threat to their dominance, can have a negative impact on nascent
energy services markets (Vine, 2005).
One group of ESCo barriers in particular that has relevance to
other PSS models is the mismatch between the characteristics of
contracts being offered by ESCos and the needs or desires of their
potential customers. Issues include:
1. Inﬂexibility of long-term contracts: Energy service contracts
typically last for between 5 and 30 years (Westling, 2003;
Sorrell, 2005; Fawkes, 2007; Smith, 2007). Such a long-term
commitment can constrain customers' ﬂexibility; undesirable
should their situation change (Sorrell, 2005; Boait, 2009;
Marino et al., 2011).
2. Disruption to customer activities: Energy efﬁciency in-
terventions can disrupt customers' normal routine (Sorrell,
2005; Marino et al., 2011).
3. Threats to privacy: Customers may be concerned that conﬁ-
dential data or information will become exposed as the ESCo
‘over-hauls’ aspects of their company's energy consumption
(Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2005; Sorrell, 2005).
4. Perceived high level of energy efﬁciency: Some consumers
wrongly perceive themselves to be very energy efﬁcient, further
pushing such investments down the corporate agenda that do
not typically rank highly anyway (Sorrell, 2005; Vine, 2005;
Marino et al., 2011).
5. In-house technical expertise: Some organisations already
possess in-house technical energy efﬁciency expertise and so
they do not require external help (Marino et al., 2011; Sorrell,
2005).
6. Inability to sanction energy service contracts: Many con-
sumers do not have the responsibility to sign an energy service
contract (Sorrell, 2005), most notably tenants. Conversely,
landlords with the authority may opt against such contracts
because they are not responsible for the energy bills, often
referred to as the ‘landlord-tenant problem’ (IEA, 2007).
As a sub-set of the PSS family there are some barriers to ESCo
application that may be distinct to ESCos and not PSSs in general.
For example, whilst cultural status is often attached to the
ownership of numerous products, such as property and vehicles,
the same cultural status is not normally attached to the ownership
of units of energy, such as gas and electricity. Another example
might be in relation to energy speciﬁc regulation. For instance,
Smith (2007) explains that electricity supply, generation, distribu-
tion or transmission licensing laws are often not structured to
support small-scale, decentralised intermittent sources of elec-
tricity, typically utilised by ESCos providing ESCs. Finally, energy
speciﬁc price signals such as low and ﬂuctuating energy prices are
not conducive to a strong ESCo market (Marino et al., 2011) given
that a key part of the ESCo value proposition is a reduction in
customers' energy bills. Nevertheless, we argue in Section 5 that a
number of useful lessons can be drawn from the study of ESCos for
policies to support PSS uptake in other sectors.
2.3. Supporting PSS and ESCo activity via ‘demand pull’ government
policy
2.3.1. Deﬁning and categorising ‘demand pull’ government policy
Innovation systems theory has been prevalent in exploring how
government policy can help to support the development and
deployment of innovations. Whilst this has traditionally centred on
technological innovations (Carlsson and Stankiewicz,1991; Hekkert
et al., 2007), some of which possess a strong sustainable develop-
ment focus (Krozer and Nentjes, 2008), this focus has beenbroadened recently to include non-technological innovations, such
as novel environmentally-oriented business models and practices
(Mont and Emtairah, 2008; Laukkanen and Patala, 2014; Smith and
Crotty, 2008). The discourse frames innovation as an evolutionary,
non-linear process (Grubler et al., 2012; Truffer et al., 2012), which
can be supported via a combination of ‘supply push’ and ‘demand
pull’ mechanisms, many of which take the form of government
policy.
Grubler et al. (2012) explain that ‘supply push’ policies relate to
forces that affect the generation of new knowledge, such as gov-
ernment sponsored research and development (R&D), tax credits
for companies to invest in R&D, enhancing the capacity for
knowledge exchange, support for education and training, and
funding demonstration projects (Grubler et al., 2012; Gallagher
et al., 2006; Nemet, 2009).
‘Demand pull’ policies on the other hand refer to those that
shape the demand for innovations (Grubler et al., 2012). Margolis
(2002) divides these into three categories: direct purchases (e.g.
public procurement schemes), regulation (e.g. technical standards)
and economic incentives (e.g. tax breaks, subsidies etc.) (see Fig. 2).
Edler (2010, 2013) and Edler et al. (2012) add another dimension
to this framework titled indirect government support, which typi-
cally includes schemes to raise awareness, stimulate innovation
usereproducer interaction, improve capabilities via training and
articulate innovation needs or preferences. Synthesising these
related ‘demand pull’ policy analytical frameworks the following
four ‘demand pull’ policy categories are presented, which forms the
analytical framework for this paper (see Section 3):
 Regulation e actions aiming to modify agents' behaviour by
deﬁning or changing sets of rules (e.g. restrictions, standards,
and controls) (Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010);
 Economic incentives e actions aiming to modify agents'
behaviour through a market-based incentives (e.g. tax breaks,
subsidies etc.) (Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010);
 Informative policies e actions aiming to disseminate knowl-
edge to agents (e.g. companies, consumers) (Ceschin and
Vezzoli, 2010);
 Direct public sector purchasingewhere the state buys for own
use and/or to catalyse private market via procurement schemes
(Edler, 2013).
A separate but related theme presented by Edler (2013) relates
to how these different ‘demand pull’ government policies ﬁt
together and thus how these policiesmight be designed holistically.
2.3.2. ‘Demand pull’ policies to support PSS activity
By applying this framework to the types of PSS ‘demand pull’
policies that have been identiﬁed in the extant literature we ﬁnd
that a common theme is the need for regulation that internalizes
the inherent environmental cost of production and consumption,
thus encouraging ﬁrms to engage with more resource-efﬁcient
service-based solutions (Mont and Lindhqvist, 2003; Tukker
et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010). Some other authors
have recommended the need for economic incentives, most notably
cheaper ﬁnance to cover the upfront costs of PSS projects (Tukker
et al., 2008; Bilsen et al., 2013). With respect to informative policies
both public and private sector engagement could be encouraged
via the establishment of learning initiatives designed to improve
both understanding and awareness of PSS models amongst both
suppliers and consumers (Tukker et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli,
2010; Kr€amer and Herrndorf, 2012; Mont and Lindhqvist, 2003).
Finally, to stimulate public sector PSS engagement, some authors
(Larsen and Svane, 2005; Tukker et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli,
2010) have recommended the redesign of public sector purchasing
Fig. 2. An illustration of actors and their interactions in energy-technology innovation (Margolis, 2002 p.271).
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in their purchase guidelines and prioritise these over product
sales.
More broadly, Kr€amer and Herrndorf (2012) recommend the
need for holistic approaches to policy design that champion a stable
and consistent policy environment that provides prospective PSS
ﬁrms with the conﬁdence that in the future they will be operating
their business in a broadly supportive environment (Kr€amer and
Herrndorf, 2012).2.3.3. ‘Demand pull’ policies to support ESCo activity
Echoing the point made in Section 2.2, many supportive PSS
policies may also promote ESCo activity, given that they are related.
Examples include awareness raising amongst both prospective
ESCos and ESCo customers (Sorrell, 2007; Steinberger et al., 2009;
Marino et al., 2011), schemes to help ESCos more easily leverage
ﬁnance (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Steinberger et al., 2009; Hansen, 2011;
Marino et al., 2011) and incorporating energy efﬁciency as a criteria
for public procurement of energy (Marino et al., 2011).
In contrast some policy solutions are speciﬁc to the ESCo model
and not PSSs in general. In terms of regulation, recommendations
include the establishment of Energy Utility energy efﬁciency obli-
gations (Bertoldi et al., 2013) and building regulations that incor-
porate very high energy efﬁciency standards (Smith, 2007). In
terms of economic incentives, Lindgren and Nilsson (2009) identify
the importance of ﬁnancial incentives to install energy efﬁciency
measures. Recommendations for informative policies include
training programmes that cultivate the skills necessary to deliver
energy service contracts (Steinberger et al., 2009; Marino et al.,
2011), energy service accreditation and standardisation schemes
to build market conﬁdence (Sorrell, 2007; Marino et al., 2011) and
establishing an ESCo association to act as a reference point for
ESCos customers and suppliers, as well as a uniﬁed voice to
represent its members (Marino et al., 2011). Finally, public sector
purchasing policy recommendations include the provision of en-
ergy service contract templates to avoid using resources to draft
these ‘from new’ during procurement (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Sorrell,
2007; Steinberger et al., 2009; Marino et al., 2011).2.4. Opportunities for further research into PSS and ESCo policy
drivers
To help frame the contribution of this paper we brieﬂy discuss
the opportunities for further research in the PSS and ESCo ﬁeld that
have been identiﬁed by other scholars.
With respect to the PSS literature, Tukker and Tischner (2006),
Baines et al. (2007) and Ceschin (2013) all emphasise that sur-
prisingly little attention has thus far been paid to how policy could
support PSS activity. Additionally, Beuren et al. (2013) explain that
the existing PSS literature would beneﬁt from additional empirical
evidence to reﬁne many of its theoretical insights. Consequently
this paper aims to present an empirically based investigation into
how government policy has inﬂuenced the adoption of the ESCo
model, fromwhich lessons are drawn for PSSs ﬁrmsmore generally.
With respect to the ESCo literature the authors argue that there
has been relatively few contemporary studies on UK ESCo activity,
withmuch of the existingwork having been conducted a number of
years ago now (Sorrell, 2005, 2007; Smith, 2007; Sorrell, 2007),
during which time UK energy policy landscape has changed
dramatically. Whilst Marino et al. (2011) have conducted a more
recent study on UK ESCo market developments as part of a wider
international study but incorporated only a handful of expert in-
terviews. Consequently this paper offers an up-to-date and in-
depth examination of the UK ESCo market developments, draw-
ing upon 43 interviews for a single country. The paper also builds
on our previous work, which investigated factors affecting the
uptake of the ESCo model in the UK by analysing the coevolution of
the ESCo model with other business models, technologies, in-
stitutions and user practices (Hannon et al., 2013). The current
paper examines in much greater depth how government policy can
improve the prospects of ESCo activity.3. Methodology
The methodology outlined in this paper mobilised the analytical
framework presented in Section 2.3.1, which is used to order the
results and discussion presented in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In
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Ceschin and Vezzoli (2010) as part of their research on supportive
PSS policies, also focusing explicitly on ‘demand-pull’ policies
rather than ‘supply push’ too. This is because PSSs are consumer-
facing businesses operating, looking to bring together an innova-
tive mix of technologies, services etc. into an attractive market
proposition. They are therefore not normally engaged in ‘supply
push’ policy inﬂuenced activities like basic or applied R&D at the
lower end of the innovation chain.
Prior to any primary data collection an extensive review was
undertaken of academic, governmental, industrial and third sector
literature on energy service provision and UK ESCo activity. From
this, a variety of key energy service market stakeholders in the UK
were identiﬁed as potential interviewees. A ‘snowball sampling’
method was also employed, whereby interviewees with desired
traits or characteristics give names of further appropriate in-
terviewees (Black, 1999), helping to identify individuals for inter-
view that were previously unknown to the researcher (Bryman,
2012).
The interviewees typically had extensive experience of resi-
dential and commercial ESCo operation and/or working alongside
these types of ESCos, either in an operational (e.g. provision of
ﬁnancial, technical or legal expertise) or strategic capacity (e.g.
design of ESCo related policy) and spanned a broad range of pro-
fessional backgrounds relevant to energy provision and use. In
total, 43 semi-structured, in-depth stakeholder interviews were
conducted between 22nd July 2010 and 22nd May 2012, each lasting
approximately 1 hour long (see Appendix A). Interviewees were
invited to talk not only about the factors that have supported or
inhibited ESCo activity in the UK but also the types of government
policy interventions that have helped to support ESCo activity in
the past, as well as additional measures that might address market
barriers in the future.5 They were encouraged to illustrate their
responses with speciﬁc examples of ESCo activity.
To make sense of the qualitative data, thematic analysis was
employed using the coding software NVivo 8. This was undertaken
in line with the principles of Straussian Grounded Theory in order
to assist theory building (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which strikes a
balance between inductive and deductive approaches. According to
Ezzy (2002) this approach dictates that the researcher is free to
draw upon existing theory, such as that presented in Section 2.3, to
shape their research questions and inform how they interpret their
data. However, they must not allow this pre-existing theory to
constrain what is noticed.
Taking into account the size of the interviewee sample
compared to that of the UK ESCo sector, it is difﬁcult to draw
generalizations from the outputs of this study. Instead, the empir-
ical investigation constitutes a qualitative exploratory study,
designed to provide insight into not only how UK energy policy has
served to either support or hinder ESCo activity but also how les-
sons from this case could help to support PSS activity in other
sectors.
4. Results
4.1. Existing, emerging and possible demand policy drivers for UK
ESCo market growth
This section presents a range ‘demand-pull’ government policies
identiﬁed by the interviewees as having already helped to support
ESCo activity in the UK or those that have the potential, namely
emerging (i.e. policies under development) and possible (i.e. policies5 See Appendix B for a set of typical interview questions.that could plausibly be developed) policies. Appendix C presents the
details of some existing policies that require further explanation,
alongside how they have supported ESCo activity and the number of
interviewees referenced them using the notation ‘n ¼ X’, which is
also used in the main body of text. All policies are categorised ac-
cording to the analytical framework presented in Section 2.3.1.4.1.1. Regulation
Regulatory demand-pull policies that have helped support ESCo
activity in the UK include energy efﬁciency obligations and low-
carbon building and planning regulations. Moves to devolve more
power to local municipal authorities and further changes to elec-
tricity trading arrangements could also positively inﬂuence the
take up of the ESCo model.4.1.1.1. Energy efﬁciency obligations.
The UK has over the years had in place a series of energy efﬁ-
ciency obligations on large energy suppliers that obligate them to
deliver a certain level of greenhouse gas emissions savings via the
delivery of consumer energy efﬁciency measures. Failing to do so
incurs a heavy ﬁne unless they acquire purchase allowances. A
number of interviewees identiﬁed these as an important policy
driver (n ¼ 7), for instance because they have encouraged larger
energy suppliers to team up with smaller ESCos to achieve these
reductions, thus opening up a revenue stream to this market:
‘There are all sorts of obligations imposed on the [Energy Utilities]
that we have tapped in, and not just for the CHP. We tap into it all
the time and we have had a lot of money out of them over the years’
(Manager, Local Authority ESCo)
Importantly however, this research ﬁnds that these obligations
provide little incentive for Energy Utilities to radically alter their
business model because they do not remove the Energy Utilities'
‘volume sales driver’, an issue also identiﬁed by Eyre (2008). It does
little to stimulate major interest across the major UK Energy Util-
ities to move away from their traditional business model, where
their revenue increases with the number of units of gas and elec-
tricity sold. In contrast, the ESCo model would either wholly or
partly decouple revenue from energy throughput. The obligations
could be strengthened to either mandate or encourage Energy
Utilities to fundamentally restructure their business model in away
that satisﬁes their customers' energy needs in a sustainablemanner
rather than making a few minor operational changes that are
capable of satisfying the obligation's requirements.
It is also important to note that the UK's energy supplier obli-
gations relate only to domestic energy supply. To help improve the
efﬁciency of commercial energy supply the CRC Energy Efﬁciency
Scheme was established, which is an obligation on commercial
consumers rather than on suppliers. It requires large energy con-
sumers to buy annual allowances to cover the emissions associated
with their energy consumption. A number of interviewees identi-
ﬁed this as an important driver (n ¼ 11), largely because it has
driven energy efﬁciency up the corporate agenda by imposing
ﬁnancial penalties on large corporations who exhibit poor levels of
energy efﬁciency:
‘[With the CRC] you are now getting the likes of Diaggio and BP
going ‘Oh God, I've got to write a cheque for £2 million, where's that
come from? … Think of their energy spend, it is massive’ (Director
of Sustainable Energy Finance, Multi-national Bank)
There is currently some debate around whether these efﬁciency
obligations should be placed on commercial suppliers or on
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approaches have proved effective in the UK and so government
should consider placing obligations on both the supplier and the
consumer to improve the efﬁciency with which users consume
energy. This would avoid the issue of ‘split incentives’ between the
two parties with regards to improving energy efﬁciency levels. For
ESCos this would mean that not only would they be well-placed to
discharge this obligation but that there would be greater interest
amongst consumers in the value proposition of their energy efﬁ-
ciency solutions, given the obligation placed upon on them to
improve their levels of energy efﬁciency. However, further research
is required to understand whether these two policy approaches
could work alongside one another in practice.
4.1.1.2. Electricity trading arrangements.
Some interviewees (n ¼ 2) explained that the current UK elec-
tricity trading arrangements (i.e. BETTA) were not supportive of
small-scale, decentralised energy generation, distribution and
supply, particularly those which rely on intermittent sources of
renewable energy. One LA chief executive explained that the cur-
rent market structure is biased towards the need of large-scale
Energy Utility companies, arguing that: ‘the rules are written for
them’ and that ‘the transaction and membership costs are inhibitive’.
Their colleague, a managing director of the LA's ESCo, explained
that to enter the electricity market to trade their electricity and that
‘it would cost us £500,000 minimum to join that pool … far too much
as a small supplier’.
Thispresentsa critical barrier toESCoswhotypicallyengage in this
typeof activity, one thathas beenhighlightedpreviously (Section2.2).
The research ﬁnds that the prospects for ESCos could be improved if
the market were re-structured so that companies sourcing their
electricity from intermittent (renewable) sources of energy were not
penalised to the same extent that they are now. Additionally, relaxing
the caps imposedbyelectricity licence exemption rules on the scale of
generation, distribution and supply would enable companies, who
were ill-equipped to trade on the electricity market, to operate at
larger scales and harness greater economies of scale. In turn, this
would reduce their transaction costs per kWh of electricity sold and
consequently improve their proﬁt margin. Alternatively, the system
could be re-structured so that smaller-scale electricity companies are
not subjected to the same membership costs as larger scale com-
panies; such is the high cost of connectivity to the grid.
4.1.1.3. Low-carbon planning and building regulations.
Planning permission relates to a Local Authority's (LA) formal
permission to erect or alter a building or similar development and is
largely dependent on the type of impact it will have on its imme-
diate environment. A number of interviewees (n ¼ 5) highlighted
how important planning was to whether or not an ESCo could
deliver a project or not was the extent to which LAs prioritised the
need for developments with energy efﬁciency and/or renewable
energy solutions:
‘[If] planning people say I want CHP on that site otherwise I will not
give you planning permission, then you have to provide a gas ﬁred
CHP. If they believe in that and insist on that because they believe it
gives a low carbon solution … you cannot get your site off the
ground [without it]’ (Sustainability Director, Private Sector ESCo)
Following successful planning permission in the UK, whoever
constructs the building must adhere to building regulations. In
recent years these have incorporated more stringent standards
around energy efﬁciency and the UK government has set a target
within the building regulations requiring new domestic homes to
be ‘zero-carbon’ by 2016 and new commercial buildings to be zero-carbon by 2019. These targets present a huge challenge to de-
velopers, and many observers are sceptical that they will be met. A
number of interviewees (n ¼ 3) explained that highly energy efﬁ-
cient building regulations can help to support ESCo market growth
because some developers opt to transfer this responsibility to
ESCos, who deliver low-carbon energy solutions on their behalf:
‘Developers have this requirement on them to meet a … carbon
reduction or … renewable [target]. They don't know how to deal
with this … They would say ‘look, I don't want to deal with this
hassle. I want you guys take it away fromme’… So what they do is
employ us to design, build, fund and operate an ESCo company
[and] take that responsibility for meeting their planning conditions'
(Head of Community Energy, Energy Utility ESCo Division)
It should be noted that building regulations are mostly relevant
to new-build projects and whilst the research found evidence of
developers contracting ESCos to meet these efﬁciency standards on
their behalf, ESCos have traditionally engagedwith retroﬁt projects.
Consequently, opportunities to implement policy that obligates
landlords of existing buildings to meet certain energy efﬁciency
standards rather than just new-build should be explored.
4.1.1.4. Local government powers.
A lack of Local Authority (LA) willingness to engage with and
support ESCo projects was identiﬁed as a critical barrier to ESCo
projects by a range of interviewees (n ¼ 9), largely because LAs in
the UK are capable of either establishing their own arms-length
ESCos, facilitating the development of energy service contracts
being developed by other ESCos (e.g. via planning) or by acting as a
customer for an independent ESCo (see Bale et al., 2012; Hannon,
2012; Hannon and Bolton, 2015).
At present one approach to encourage LAs to engage with low-
carbon energy initiatives is through voluntary emissions reduction
schemes, such as the Covenant of Mayors movement in Europe
where covenant signatories aim to meet and exceed the European
Union 20% CO2 reduction objective by 2020 (Covenant of Mayors,
2013). However, the voluntary nature of these initiatives means
that LAs are free to ignore them. Obligatory city-level emissions
reduction targets as recommended by the CCC (2012) could address
this issue and encourage LAs to engage with ESCo model to meet
these targets via energy efﬁciency gains.
Instead of constraining LAs decision making via obligations, one
alternative is to widen their powers. For instance, the UK's 2011
Localism Act provides LAs in England and Wales with the power to
implement any policy that they consider to have the potential to
promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of
their area, unless these measures are explicitly prohibited by na-
tional legislation (DCLG, 2011). Some interviewees explained that
these additional powers have helped some LAs to implement en-
ergy projects (n¼ 8) who have traditionally found it difﬁcult due to
their limited powers. The Localism Act also makes provisions to
provide community organisations with additional powers, such as
the right to draw up neighbourhood plans allowing them to bring
forward building developments that themajority of the community
would like to see built (DCLG, 2011). These additional powers could
enable local groups to establish their own energy initiatives: ‘If the
community wants to go ahead with it, why should some higher level
stop them doing it?’ (Committee Member, Community ESCo).
Some interviewees (n ¼ 3) also highlighted how important it
was that LAs had been granted wider powers to implement energy
supply projects via deregulation, namely the repeal of a clause in
the 1976 Local Government Act in 2010 that had previously pro-
hibited LAs ‘from selling electricity which is produced otherwise
than in association with heat [e.g. CHP]’ (DECC, 2010 p.4):
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Authorities to supply electricity. Those have been removed which
opens up a greater ability certainly for Local Authorities to become
involved in energy related schemes’ (Partner, Law Firm)
Finally, research found that a UK policy similar to the Danish
Heat Law, which provides Danish LAs with the powers to mandate
owners of new and existing buildings to connect to local low-
carbon energy schemes (DEA, 2005), could provide ESCos
providing ESCs with a much larger potential customer base and in
turn help to make the schemes more ﬁnancially viable.4.1.2. Economic incentives
Economic incentives were identiﬁed as crucial in supporting
ESCo activity in the UK. These include capital grants and long-term
ﬁnancial incentives for low-carbon energy projects. In addition,
new forms of green ﬁnance for energy efﬁciency measures have the
potential to further support ESCo activity.6 Constitutes a ﬁnancial mechanism that eliminates the need for householders to
pay upfront for sustainable energy supply (e.g. PV panels) and/or energy demand
management measures (e.g. loft insulation) as these are covered by the savings they
will generate on the customer's energy bill in the future (DECC, 2012c).4.1.2.1. Capital grants & long-term ﬁnancial incentives.
The research found a major policy drivers of ESCo activity in the
UK has been the provision of ﬁnancial incentives (n¼ 16) (i.e. Feed-
in-Tariff and the Renewable Heat Incentive) and capital grants
(n ¼ 9) designed to alleviate concerns around the high costs often
associated low-carbon energy projects, a solution to an ESCo barrier
identiﬁed by other research (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). For instance,
long-term ﬁnancial incentives have represented a real boon for
ESCos providing ESCs because they provided them with long-term
(typically 25 years) payments for low-carbon generation of elec-
tricity or heat, bolstering their revenue streams.
‘[They are] brilliant for ESCos… It is guaranteed income, RPI linked
for 25 years. Where do you get that sort of guaranteed money? It is
safe as houses [and] government backed’ (Sustainability Project
Manager, Private Sector ESCo)
Additionally, capital grant schemes have helped to provide
many ESCos, who do not have easy access to ﬁnance or external
investment, with the necessary capital to cover the upfront costs of
energy service contracts.
‘Wewere fortunate because we got DECC Low Carbon Communities
challenge money. We were awarded £400,000 from that which
enabled demonstration [of our] community projects … to try some
of these ideas out’ (Committee Member, Community ESCo)
A number of interviewees (n¼ 6) highlighted that the decline of
these capital grant schemes in recent years in the UK has therefore
made it difﬁcult for less wealthy ESCos to secure the necessary
‘start up’ capital to implement projects. Interestingly however, the
decline of capital grant schemes was also seen as a positive
development by some interviewees because a reduction in grant
funding for sustainable energy projects meant that energy con-
sumers had reduced access to capital in order implement these
projects themselves, meaning they were more inclined to contract
with ESCos to cover all or most of the upfront capital costs
themselves:
‘[The] FiTs are a bit of a bonkers idea … because the barrier [to
energy projects] is the upfront capital cost, so why are we giving
them a long-term revenue stream? … The institutional and policy
arrangements might lead you to an ESCo [because] if you gave a
grant, what is the role for ESCo? [But] if you've got a FiT, you mightget a role for an ESCo. The RHI will be the same issue’ (Energy Ef-
ﬁciency Expert, University)
In light of these ﬁndings government should strike a balance
between the provision of long-term ﬁnancial incentives and capital
grant schemes. Carefully designed capital grant schemes could help
to ensure that ESCos have sufﬁcient access to capital to cover some
of the upfront costs of their projects and avoid a situation where
capital is so freely available to consumers that they do not need to
engage with ESCos to ﬁnance energy measures. Additionally, long-
term ﬁnancial incentives have been very successful in bolstering
ESCos' revenue streams, making the ESCo model more attractive to
potential adopters. However, this research suggests that subsidies
are not offered indeﬁnitely but only until the point at which the
costs of implementing these technologies (i.e. design, installation,
operation, maintenance etc.) fall sufﬁciently low following tech-
nological and learning advances that they become affordable
without government subsidises.
4.1.2.2. Green ﬁnance.
A handful of interviewees (n¼ 10) explained that ﬁnance for ESCo
projects was more readily available than it had been in the past,
however various interviewees (n ¼ 11) still highlighted a lack of pri-
vate sector ﬁnance and investment in ESCo projects as a key barrier:
‘No matter how good the project was, you need the right kind of
money and the right kind of money just isn't available’ (Partner,
Low-carbon Agricultural Think Tank).
As highlighted in Section 4.1.3.1, ESCo awareness raising initia-
tives could play an important role in leveraging ﬁnance by raising
awareness amongst investors and ﬁnanciers about the potential
beneﬁts of investing in energy service contract projects. These
should focus on investors who prefer low-risk, long-term,medium-
return investments (e.g. pension funds), which broadly match the
characteristics of energy service contracting. A more direct solution
identiﬁed by the research and previous work (Section 2.3) is to
introduce schemes that enable ESCos to leverage ﬁnance more
easily. The most recent and high-proﬁle example of such a scheme
in the UK is the Green Investment Bank, established to help orga-
nisations engaging in sustainable development activities circum-
vent many of the existing barriers they face in accessing ﬁnance. It
has enjoyed a promising start, investing £700 million in 21 projects
in its ﬁrst year (GIB, 2013).
Another ﬁnance scheme is the Green Deal,6 introduced by the
UK government in January 2013, to stimulate the ﬁnancing of do-
mestic low-carbon energy improvements. In response, an industry-
led consortium set up the Green Deal Finance Company (GDFC,
2012) was established to provide the lowest cost ﬁnance neces-
sary to fund Green Deal projects. However, the uptake of the Green
Deal has so far beenmodest with only 2,248 households having had
Green Deal Plans signed or completed up to the end of June 2014
(DECC, 2014). Whilst a number of reasons for this poor uptake have
been identiﬁed by previous research (UKGBC, 2014), such as poor
communication, complexity and high interest rates, the interviews
were conducted prior to the schemes launch so whilst this research
identiﬁes the need for this kind of green ﬁnance schemes it does
not present any new evidence to inform the redesign of the Green
Deal. Nevertheless, this research ﬁnds that this type of innovative
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the ESCo business model bymaking ﬁnancemore freely available to
them.
4.1.3. Informative policies
Informative policies could help to address the barrier associated
with the lack of awareness and understanding of the ESComodel by
key actors. Awareness initiatives, training schemes, energy service
contract standardisation, and accreditation and certiﬁcation
schemes were identiﬁed by the interviewees as potential policies to
overcome this barrier.
4.1.3.1. Awareness initiatives.
One of the most signiﬁcant barriers to UK ESCo activity high-
lighted by the interviewees (n ¼ 18) was a lack of awareness of the
ESCo model. This was sometimes coupled with a poor under-
standing of the ESCo model and in particular damaging mis-
conceptions of the businessmodel, amongst both prospective ESCos
and customers (n¼ 6). For instance one interviewee explained that:
‘Getting the market to understand what is on offer … is a key
constraint … I don't think that the market genuinely understood
what we were trying to do when we ﬁrst explained to them’
(Sustainability Director, Private Sector ESCo).
Some interviewees (n ¼ 5) also identiﬁed that the ambiguity
and complexity of the energy policy landscape presented an
important barrier to ESCo activity, with one interviewee com-
menting that:
‘Everyone is trying to ﬁnd their way through this structure, this
crazy and difﬁcult ﬁnancial world, alongside the carbon impera-
tives… [It's] very complex’ (Sustainability Project Manager, Private
Sector ESCo).
In light of these ﬁndings this research supports the need to
establish publicly funded initiatives to promote understanding and
awareness of energy service contracting amongst both prospective
ESCos and ESCo customers, a call echoed by previous work (Section
2.3). Additionally, these educational initiatives should also make
provision for helping both prospective ESCo and customers to un-
derstand the wider energy policy landscape, in order to help them
navigate it. The research ﬁnds that government could be well
placed to not only fund but also manage these initiatives. This is
evidenced by DECC's Community Energy Online Portal (DECC,
2012a), which is designed to raise communities' awareness of en-
ergy funding, best practice case studies, planning issues etc., and to
help them establish community energy organisations. However,
non-departmental public bodies (e.g. Energy Savings Trust) or trade
associations (e.g. Energy Service and Technology Association
(ESTA)) could also deliver these schemes. Importantly, EU member
states will soon have to consider how best to implement these
recommendations given that the new European Energy Efﬁciency
Directive (EEED) obligates them to disseminate clear and easily
accessible information about arrangements for energy service
contracting and the various energy policies in existence that sup-
port energy service projects (EU, 2012).
4.1.3.2. Training schemes.
A number of interviewees (n ¼ 5) identiﬁed that there is a lack
of people in the UK with the necessary skills to develop and deliver
energy service contracts, particularly the measurement and veri-
ﬁcation of energy savings, as well as the operation and mainte-
nance of low-carbon energy equipment:‘Finding people who understand [energy service contracts] and can
structure them correctly is not easy. They are rare and not easy to
ﬁnd’ (Product Development and Energy Services Manager, Energy
Utility ESCo Division).
This research consequently supports the need to establish pro-
grammes that develop the skills necessary to deliver energy service
contracts and in turn help grow the ESCo market, a recommenda-
tion outlined in other research (Section 2.3). These initiatives may
be subsumed within, or take a similar approach to, initiatives such
as Scotland's Low Carbon Skills Fund (SDS, 2012) and the UK gov-
ernment's Green Deal Skills Alliance (Green Deal Initiative, 2012),
that are designed to cultivate the skills necessary to deliver sus-
tainable energy measures in the UK.
4.1.3.3. Energy service contract standardisation.
A number of interviewees (n ¼ 7) explained that the lack of
standardized energy service contracts in the UK has made the sales
process lengthy and resource intensive as ESCos currently spend
signiﬁcant amounts of time developing bespoke service contracts
with customers. One interviewee explained that:
‘The time that gets spent negotiating these contracts is ridiculous
[because] the terms of the individual supply agreements, the leases,
all require substantial amount of rework generally and you go
through this process with each project of explaining the conﬂicts
and limitations… Regulation would hopefully speed up the process
[by] standardising the arrangements’ (Partner, Law Firm)
One way of addressing this situation might be through the pro-
vision of freely available energy service contract templates, which
ESCos are able to use when drafting their own contracts, could
present a way forward. Some interviewees explained that lessons
about how to provide these templates from the Greater London
Authority's (GLA) RE:FIT energy service contract procurement
framework, which offers pre-negotiated, EU-regulation compliant
framework contracts as part of the procurement procedure (see
Section 4.1.4). Alternatively, contract templates could be offered by
ESCo associations such as Energy Services and Trade Association
(ESTA) in the UK or the European trade association EU-ESCo.
Another option could be to promote standardisation via the pro-
vision of clear contractual deﬁnitions and protocols that provide
customerswith somepeace ofmind that theESCowill providea high-
quality of service. One example has been the introduction of Inter-
national Performance Measurement & Veriﬁcation Protocol (IPMVP)
for EPCs, initially developed by a collection of organisations in the US,
constitutes an important step forward in this regard as it provides an
overview of current best practice techniques available for verifying
results of energy efﬁciency, water efﬁciency, and renewable energy
projects (DOE, 2002). Following such ‘goodpractice’protocols, energy
service contract accreditation and certiﬁcation schemes could also
help to promote standardisation, alongside building consumer trust.
The research warns however that energy service contract
standardisation is difﬁcult to achieve given the bespoke nature of
energy service contracting, where part of an ESCo's value proposi-
tion is that its contracts are tailored to the speciﬁc needs of the
customer and their built environment. Even so serious consider-
ation will have to be given to this issue given that the recently
ratiﬁed EEED requiresmember states to providemodel contracts for
energy performance contracting in the public sector (EU, 2012).
4.1.4. Direct public sector purchasing
The research identiﬁed that public sector organisations tend to
be well suited to energy service contracts considering that they
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demand over the long-term. Also, contracting with a single large
energy users means the ESCos is able to capture good economies of
scale compared to contracting with multiple customers occupying
smaller sites, helping to reduce their transaction costs (Section
2.1.2). Furthermore, public sector organisations are also attractive to
ESCos because they are ﬁnancially backed by government. As one
interviewee explained ‘the public sector never goes bust’ (Associate,
District Heat and Electricity Association), thus giving the ESCo con-
ﬁdence that its public sector customers will not default on their
payments. Despite this strong ﬁt a number of interviewees (n ¼ 8)
found that the current public procurement framework, based on the
Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union's (OJEU) guidelines, has
hindered the uptake of energy service contracts by the public sector:
‘If you want to do [an EPC] with more than a certain amount of
money you will have to go through OJEU to procure an ESCo in this
costs money and time… It takes two years and it will cost £250,000
to procure from scratch … It is easier to say I'm doing nothing’
(Project Leader of Energy Services Procurement Framework,
Regional Development Agency)
In the context of these ﬁndings the research supports the need
for procurement protocols that are more supportive of energy
service contracting, echoing calls in previous research (Section 2.3).
In particular clear, a number of interviewees (n ¼ 5) emphasised
that lessons could be learnt from the GLA's RE:FIT scheme. They
highlighted how it had offered practical and ready-to-use guide-
lines to help organisations navigate the energy service contract
procurement process, as well as pre-negotiated, EU-regulation
compliant framework contracts as part of its procedure (Section
4.1.3.3), meaning that organisations procuring energy service con-
tracts through this framework had typically reduced their pro-
curement time from 12 to 18 months period via OJEU to
approximately 3 to 6 months (Managenergy, 2011).
4.2. Holistic approach to policy design
None of these policies operate in isolation; instead operating
alongside one another. Consequently, it is important for government
to consider how compatible and sustainable these policies are over a
number of years to ensure a stable and robust policy framework is
developed. A host of interviewees (n¼ 7) explained that this had not
necessarily been achieved in the UK and that a key barrier to the
delivery of innovative, low-carbon energy projects in general is the
uncertainty surrounding the future energy policy developments
generated in part by the frequently changing of UK energy policy:
‘[UK energy] policy has been communicated and implemented in
such a mishandled and volatile way. It means conﬁdence is very
low in any external monetary incentive … Policy is a moving
goalpost’ (Director, Private Sector ESCo)
Consequently, many potential ESCos, as well as their investors
and customers, have shied away from long-term energy service
contracts because they are uncertain whether the policy landscape
will be supportive of their project in the future. Uncertainty was
largely attributed to the UK government's various swift and un-
foreseen changes in energy policy over recent years, such as the
much contested FiT cuts of early 2012. The ﬁndings suggest that a
clear policy roadmap, alongside a strong commitment from the
government to adhere to this strategy, is needed in order to build
actors' conﬁdence that engaging with an energy service project
would prove ﬁnancially and operationally viable in the future.
However, it is important to understand that, like energy suppliersandusers, policymakers donot have perfect foresight either and that
unforeseen developments (e.g. natural disasters, geopolitical con-
ﬂicts, economic downturns) often require swift policy responses.
4.3. Barriers not easily addressed by UK government policy
Whilst UK government policy is already making a valuable
contribution to addressing key barriers to ESCo activity or is likely to
in the future not all barriers to ESCo activity identiﬁed in the UK can
easily be addressed by policy alone, especially those tied to interna-
tional developments. For instance, international economic trends can
be damaging to ESCo activity, such as the global economic downturn
in the late 2000s that limited the availability ofmuch neededﬁnance
for ESCos. Additionally, whilst national government can have an
important bearingonconsumer fossil fuel prices indomesticmarkets
through mechanisms such as subsidies and tax breaks, these are
dictated in large part by the international energy market, which is
sensitive to a wide variety of developments that are largely beyond
the control of the UK government (e.g. geopolitical conﬂicts, global
production levels etc.). The UK government has also made efforts to
subsidise the cost of a variety of low-carbon, distributed energy
technologies thatarewell suited to theESComodel. Examples include
thesubsidisationof low-carbonelectricityandheatmicro-generation
technologies through the FiT and the RHI respectively. However, the
‘per unit’ cost of these technologies is very much dependent on in-
ternational R&D efforts and the development of global supply chains,
which the UK government has limited control over.
Government policy is also unlikely to address some of the
intrinsic characteristics of the ESCo model that limit its uptake (see
Section 2.2). These include the long-term contracts ESCos provide
which limit consumer freedom, the small scale at which ESCos
normally operate that can constrain the economies of scale they
enjoy and ESCos' focus on bespoke contracting, which limits their
ability to easily replicate contracts from one project to the next:
‘The big problem with the Distributed Energy (DE) ESCo model is
that it is very bespoke and as a result it is very costly, lawyers make
a fortune. It doesn't tend to be highly replicable and that is a
problem’ (Director, Private Sector ESCo)
Finally, UK government policy is subject to decisions taken at a
European or international level, which can sometimes undermine
ESCo activity. For example, European State Aid Rules cap howmuch
government funding that commercial organisations can receive,
which has served to constrain the activities of certain community
and LA owned ESCos who are very reliant on government subsidy:
‘You can only have state aid up to the de minimus threshold, which
is 200,000 euros … If you go above it you are breaking [the law]’
(Committee Member, Community ESCo).
5. Learning from the UK ESCo case: policies to support PSS
uptake in other sectors
This section situates the ﬁndings from the ESCo case study in the
context of the broader PSS research landscape in an attempt to
identify some lessons about how government policy could help to
support PSS application in other sectors.
5.1. Balancing the mix of direct policy incentives and disincentives
Previous research has identiﬁed the importance of both direct
policy incentives and disincentives in supporting both ESCo and
PSS activity (Section 2.3). Whilst this research supports this view it
goes one step further to call for both economic incentives (Section
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neously, as well as for a balance to be struck not only between these
policies but also within these policy categories. For example, a
balance between long-term economic incentives versus one-off
capital grants (Section 4.1.2.1) and supplier versus consumer ori-
ented efﬁciency regulations (Section 4.1.1.1).
Given that PSSmodels are normally structured to satisfy common
human needs and desires, with lower associated environmental
degradation compared to traditional businessmodels,many scholars
have recommended the introduction of economic incentives and
regulation that helps to ‘level the playing ﬁeld’ between PSS and
incumbent, product-based ﬁrms (Mont and Lindhqvist, 2003;
Tukker et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010). This is considering
that the high-costs typically associated with new markets due to
immature technologies and underdeveloped supply chains. This
research identiﬁes similar needs but with some important caveats.
Focusing on economic incentives, the ESCo case study identiﬁed
that both ‘one-off’ capital grants schemes and long-term ﬁnancial
incentives for low-carbon energy generation have proved invaluable
to the establishment of this PSS model, particularly during a period
when private sector investment was not forthcoming due to the
immaturity of the sector. However, recently in theUK there has been
a move away from capital grants towards long-term ﬁnancial in-
centives, such as the FiT and RHI. This has raised issues around how
ESCos can source the necessary start-up funds to cover the various
up-front capital costs associated with establishing their business.
Whilst this paper supports the need for government to make
funding available to support the delivery of PSS projects (Mont and
Lindhqvist, 2003; Tukker et al., 2008) a balance should be struck
between these two types of subsidies to help PSS ﬁrms manage
both high initial start-up capital costs and high, ongoing opera-
tional costs typically associated with operating a business in an
immature market. Alongside these government subsidies, the ESCo
case study also underlines the importance of low-cost ﬁnance in
enabling PSS ﬁrms to cover initial upfront capital costs (Tukker
et al., 2008; Bilsen et al., 2013). This presents a very important
step in the transition of PSS ﬁrms away from government subsidies
towards private sources ﬁnance.
The paper also identiﬁes an important role for regulation in
improving the selection environment for PSSs by encouraging both
suppliers and consumers to move away from engaging with tradi-
tional, unsustainable, product-based business models. Focusing on
suppliers ﬁrst, incumbent ﬁrms employing these types of models
are unlikely to question their ‘business as usual’ approach whilst
their current mode of business remains proﬁtable (Mont, 2002,
2004; Charter et al., 2008; Ceschin, 2013). Therefore, there is a
need for policies such as UK energy supplier obligations that
impose ﬁnancial penalties on companies who choose to operate
unsustainable, product-based business models, thus translating
any environmentally adverse effects of companies' core business
activities into costs upon the company (Mont and Lindhqvist, 2003;
Tukker et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010). This type of supplier
oriented regulation can also be usefully complemented by obliga-
tions that focus on encouraging consumers' to improve their levels
of resource consumption efﬁciency, such as the CRC Energy Efﬁ-
ciency Scheme in the UK. Therefore, the paper identiﬁes a need to
establish a balance between both supplier and consumer oriented
efﬁciency obligations to ensure that both parties are incentivised to
improve levels of resource efﬁciency.
5.2. Acknowledging the importance of indirect policy support
Measures that facilitate rather than directly stimulate PSS ac-
tivity are identiﬁed by both this research (Section 4.1.3) and pre-
vious work (Section 2.3) as important to PSS activity.Such policies include learning initiatives designed to improve
both understanding and awareness of PSS models amongst both
suppliers and consumers (Tukker et al., 2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli,
2010; Kr€amer and Herrndorf, 2012), which could be led by trade
associations such as ESTA in the UK. Alongside PSS-speciﬁc
learning, these initiatives could also help to provide prospective
PSS ﬁrms with insights into the workings of the wider regulatory
framework and how this might impact upon PSS activity for better
or for worse, such as DECC's Community Energy Portal in the UK
(Section 4.1.3.1).
Government could also help to develop certiﬁcation and
accreditation schemes to promote ‘best practice’ standards for PSS
activity to build trust amongst their potential customer base and to
reduce transaction costs associated with developing PSS contracts,
such as the IPMVP for ESCos (Section 4.1.3.3). Transaction costs may
also be signiﬁcantly reduced by the development and provision of
model contracts for particular PSS models, as provided via the
London's RE:FIT programme for ESCos (Section 4.1.3.3). Start-up
PSS ﬁrms could use these as a basis for their business develop-
ment, helping them to avoid costly mistakes and research into
contract design.
Finally, this paper identiﬁes the need for government-led and
funded skills training initiatives to support the uptake of PSSs by
ensuring that there is a sufﬁciently large skills base fromwhich PSS
ﬁrms can recruit the necessary staff to operate their business
(Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010). These skills are likely to range from
speciﬁc skills associated with delivering PSS projects to other
professional skills that PSS ﬁrms call upon to support the delivery of
these, such as law, ﬁnance, engineering etc. For example, the case
study identiﬁed schemes such as the UK's Green Deal Skills Alliance
(Section 4.1.3.2) as a potentially important means of developing the
skills based for the monitoring and veriﬁcation of energy savings or
the installation of micro-generation and energy efﬁciency
measures.
5.3. Redesigning existing market structures
As highlighted in previous research (Section 2.3.2) greater
ﬂexibility in market structures could support PSS business model
experimentation. This view is supported by the case of the UK ESCo
sector where this research (Section 4.1.1.2) identiﬁed that the cur-
rent electricity trading arrangement favour large-scale, non-inter-
mittent energy generation, not typically undertaken by ESCos who
operate at a smaller scale, often with intermittent renewable en-
ergy generation technologies. Another example included the
redesign of public procurement procedures (Section 4.1.4), so that
ESCo solutions should be included in public sector purchase
guidelines and are prioritised over product sales, which has been
echoed for other PSS sectors (Larsen and Svane, 2005; Tukker et al.,
2008; Ceschin and Vezzoli, 2010). These examples serve to high-
light how existing market structures can inhibit the application of
innovative business models that operate differently to incumbent
models. Consequently, the research supports the need for govern-
ment to regularly review market arrangements to identify whether
or not current market structures are bias towards incumbent
business models at the detriment of innovative forms of business
that might offer some advantages in terms of sustainable
development.
5.4. Promoting locally-led PSS activity
A key ﬁnding of this research that has not been explicitly
identiﬁed by previous work is the importance of local-level co-
ordination and facilitation of PSS activity, primarily by LAs (Section
4.1.1.4). This is primarily because LAs represent key decision
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planning etc.), which is where the majority of grassroots, sus-
tainable development initiatives begin. Consequently, national
government should take a two-track approach to mobilising LAs to
support PSS activity. The ﬁrst is to impose regulations on LAs that
either obligate or incentivize them to actively support PSS ﬁrms,
through policies such as city-level GHG emissions targets. The
second is to implement legislation that provides them with suf-
ﬁcient decision making powers to be able to support PSS activity,
such as the UK's 2011 Localism Act. Importantly, these policies
may also encourage LAs or community groups to establish their
own PSS initiatives, which could play a key role in enabling these
to meet their core objectives (e.g. economic growth, sustainable
development etc.).5.5. Creating a stable policy framework
Both previous work (Section 2.3.2) and this research (Section
4.2) underlines the importance of establishing a sufﬁciently stable
and robust policy framework that existing or prospective PSS ﬁrms
can foresee, with a relatively high degree of conﬁdence, that they
will be operating their business in a policy environment that is
broadly supportive of PSS activity in the future. This stability is also
likely to stimulate investment in this area as investors also possess
a strong degree of conﬁdence that policy will remain supportive of
PSS activity. A similar trend was highlighted by Lüthi (2010) with
respect to solar PV investment. Consequently, this paper supports
the view that governments should avoid making sudden and
drastic changes to their regulatory frameworks and ensure that the
rationale for any new energy policies is clearly communicated with
both suppliers and consumers. However, the authors acknowledge
a certain degree of regulatory ﬂexibility is essential given that un-
foreseen events commonly take place and that subsequent policy
changes may be required.6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This paper examines how government ‘demand pull’ policies
present a potentially powerful means of stimulating the uptake of
service-based, sustainable business models, commonly referred to
as PSSs. Lessons are drawn from an empirical investigation into
how government ‘demand pull’ policies have helped to support UK
ESCo activity; a PSS business model centred on the efﬁcient pro-
vision of energy services to consumers. Consequently, the paper
offers an empirically grounded and up-to-date contribution to the
debate on how government policy can stimulate not only ESCo
activity but PSS market growth more broadly (see Section 2.4). It
therefore provides insights into how government can help advance
sustainable business practices and support the move to a more
sustainable economy.
These ‘demand pull’ policies are examined using an analytical
framework synthesized from the innovation systems literature,
which categorises them in terms of regulation, economic incentives,
informative policies and direct public sector purchasing. In terms of
regulation the research supports the need for energy efﬁciency
obligations that cover both energy suppliers and consumers, as well
as supplier obligations that fundamentally challenge the ‘volume
sales driver’ that forms the basis of many energy companies'
business models. Other recommendations include a restructuring
of electricity trading arrangements to help ESCos capture stronger
economies of scale, as well as building and planning regulations
that require more stringent low-carbon energy solutions for both
new-build and retroﬁt property developments. Finally, a mix of
regulation that enables, encourages and requires LAs to deliverenergy service projects at the local-level should also help stimulate
ESCo activity.
In reference to economic incentives the research supports the
need to strike a balance between low-carbon energy capital grants
and long-term ﬁnancial incentives in a bid to help address both
capital and operational cost barriers. There is also a need to
maintain and reﬁne ‘green’ ﬁnance schemes capable of leveraging
funding for ESCo projects. In terms of informative policies the
research recommends initiatives that raise awareness of the
characteristics and beneﬁts of the ESCo model across the energy
market, as well as training initiatives to develop the skills neces-
sary to deliver energy service contracts. The research also rec-
ommends the introduction of standardised energy service contract
templates to reduce transaction costs associated with drawing up
contracts, as well as ESCo accreditation and certiﬁcation schemes
to improve consumer trust. Turning to direct public sector pur-
chasing the research calls for public sector procurement protocols
that stimulate the procurement of energy service contracts rather
than inhibit them.
More broadly the paper identiﬁes the need for these policies to
be designed in a more holistic fashion in a bid to develop in a
robust energy policy framework that gives conﬁdence to both
potential providers and users of energy service contracts that the
policy landscape will remain supportive of these activities in the
future.
Building upon the ESCo case study this paper draws ﬁve
evidence-based policy recommendations to support PSS activity:
(1) a balanced portfolio of economic incentive and regulatory
policies; (2) a combination of ‘direct’ ﬁnancial policy incentives/
disincentives and ‘indirect’ policy support such as informative
schemes to raise PSS awareness, develop PSS skills and standardise
PSS contracts, alongside PSS industry accreditation and certiﬁca-
tion schemes; (3) a (re)design of market structures (e.g. trading
arrangements, procurement frameworks etc.) to enable PSS ac-
tivity; (4) policies that encourage locally inspired PSS activity with
key roles for Local Authorities and community organisations; and
(5) a stable policy framework that inspires conﬁdence in existing
or potential PSS ﬁrms that the future policy landscape will be
supportive of their business activities.
Despite the critical role government policy could play in sup-
porting the proliferation of PSSs, the research ﬁnds that policy
cannot easily alter all aspects of socio-technical systems to support
the activity of PSSs, such as customer preferences, international
economic developments and technological progress. Additionally,
government policy is also not particularly well-equipped to
address inherent weaknesses within the structure of PSS models,
such as high transaction costs due to the bespoke nature of service
contracting and the long-term contract period of these contracts.
This emphasises that whilst government policy represents an
important means of supporting PSS activity, it constitutes only
part of the wider solution. Therefore, further research into the
types of approaches that could effectively remedy PSS barriers that
cannot easily be addressed by government policy would be
welcomed.
The research also identiﬁes that no single governance actor is
primarily responsible for developing supportive PSS policy. The
ESCo case study highlights that whilst national government plays
a central role in developing policy, other governance actors such as
European Union, trade associations, non-departmental public
bodies, community organisations and Local Authorities are also
active in this regard. Therefore, future research could examine in
greater details how governance actors other than national gov-
ernment might support PSS activity. It is also important to note
that whilst a large number of experts were interviewed as part of
this research the sample is not necessarily representative of the
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potentially uncover additional or contrasting insights and this
should be encouraged. Similarly, the research has examined only
one sub-set of PSS activity and similar empirical work into
different types of PSS activity should be conducted. Finally, the
paper has focused explicitly on ‘demand pull’ policies and that
future research might examine how ‘supply push’ policies focused
at the earlier stages of innovation might also help to support PSS
activity by developing innovative technologies that are more
amendable to sustainable, service-oriented business models.Acknowledgements
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University Senior Research Fellow
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Bank Director of Sustainable
Private sector ESCo Director
Energy Utility ESCo Division Emergent Technology
Private sector ESCo Sustainability Director
District Heat and Electricity Association Associate
Local Authority ESCo Manager
Community ESCo Chairman
Law Firm Partner
Regional Development Agency Head of Environment &
Government Department of Energy & Climate Change Policy Advisor
Energy Utility ESCo Division Director of Community
Energy Utility ESCo Division Product Development
Consumer Oriented Think Tank Chief economist and H
Private sector ESCo Director
Private sector ESCo Knowledge Transfer Pa
Local Authority Chief Executive
Local Authority ESCo Managing Director
Private Sector ESCo Director of Business De
Private Sector ESCo Head of Energy Solutio
Private Sector ESCo Business Development
Private Sector ESCo Senior Business Manag
Community ESCo Director of MPT & Mea
Community ESCo MPT Trust Accountant
Community ESCo Chair of Meadows Part
Energy Utility ESCo Division General Manager
Energy Utility ESCo Division Business Development
Energy Utility ESCo Division General ManagerAppendix B. Typical questions posed in semi-structured
interviews
Strengths and weaknesses
a) What is your experience and understanding of the ESCo model?
b) What do you believe are the key strengths and weaknesses of
the ESCo model?
Drivers and barriers
a) What are the key drivers and barriers to ESCo adoption and
operation? E.g. Governmental policy, economic climate, public
perception of climate change etc.
b) Which UK government policies currently support the ESCo
market?
ESCos and the future UK energy system
a) What role do you imagine ESCos playing in the transition to a
low-carbon UK energy system?
b) How important do you believe this role might be?
c) What are likely to be the key factors that will enable or
inhibit ESCos to fulﬁl this role in the future?
d) How might UK government policy support growth in the
ESCo market?Date
22/7/2010
nit 22/7/2010
9/8/2011
nergy Engineer 11/8/2010
d Power Research 17/9/2010
anager 17/9/2010
21/9/2010
ergy 18/10/2010
velopment 19/10/2010
cy & Environmental Care 8/12/2010
17/1/2011
8/7/2011
12/7/2011
13/7/2011
eting & Strategy Director 13/7/2011
14/7/2011
Energy Finance 20/7/2011
20/7/2011
Specialist 21/7/2011
21/7/2011
22/7/2011
4/8/2011
9/8/2011
15/8/2011
Project Leader of Energy Services Procurement Framework 15/8/2011
16/8/2011
Energy 22/9/2011
and Energy Services Manager 28/9/2011
ead of Fair markets 10/10/2011
11/1/2011
rtnership Associate 31/1/2012
10/1/2012
10/1/2012
velopment Public Services in Community Energy Division 16/1/2012
ns 19/1/2012
Manager in Community Energy Division 24/1/2012
er Commercial Energy Division 1/2/1012
dows Resident 2/2/2012
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Manager 4/5/2012
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marketPolicies Description of policy Policy's inﬂuence on ESCo
model
Nos. of
interviewees
who cited policy
driver (n ¼ 43)
Regulation
Carbon Reduction
Commitment Energy
Efﬁciency Scheme (CRC)
The CRC Energy Efﬁciency Scheme began in 2010 and requires all
organisations consuming more than 6 GWh of electricity per annum to
buy allowances each year to cover their emissions. For Phase 1
allowances started at £12/tonne of CO2 in 2011 and discussions are
ongoing about the appropriate levels for Phase 2 (Carbon Trust, 2012).
Participants' performance is also ranked in a publicly accessible league
table, designed to ‘name and shame’ poor performers.
Puts energy efﬁciency on
corporate agendas
11
Local government powers The Local Government Acts 2000 and 2003 and Localism Act 2011 have
provided LAs with the ‘power of well-being’, thus increasing their level
of political autonomy. These allow LAs in England and Wales to
implement any policy they believe will promote the economic, social
and environmental well-being of their area, unless explicitly prohibited
by national legislation (CLG, 2009).
Provided greater opportunities
for Local Authorities and
communities to establish ‘arm's
length’ ESCos
11 (split as
8 for localism
regulation and
3 for deregulation)
Energy supplier obligations The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) builds on previous supplier
obligations, the Energy Efﬁciency Commitment (2002e2008) and the
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) (2008e2012). The ECO
places an obligation on energy suppliers to achieve carbon and cost
savings in respect of three distinct targets: 20.9 MtCO2 savings under
the carbon emissions reduction obligation (CERO), 6.8 MtCO2 savings
under the carbon saving community obligation (CSCO) and £4.2 billion
savings under the home heating cost reduction obligation (HHCRO). The
targets are divided between suppliers according to a formula
proportionate to their share of domestic customers (Ofgem, 2014).
Failure to meet these can result in a ﬁne of up to 10% of their global
turnover (DECC, 2011). These targets are under review at the time of
writing.
Made upfront capital available
and encouraged Energy Utilities
to diversify their business
activities
7
Planning regulations Most new buildings or major changes to existing buildings or to the
local environment need consent, known as planning permission to
ensure that the development is acceptable to the local community.
Whilst it is informed by the National Planning Policy Framework, each
Local Authority sets a ‘local plan’, which outlining planning policies for
the local area. A combination of these has led to a prioritisation of low-
carbon building developments in some cases.
Some Local Authorities have
prioritised developments that
contain strong energy efﬁciency
and/or renewable energy
credentials
5
Building regulations The energy efﬁciency requirements of the Building Regulations are set
out in Part L of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations and in a number
of speciﬁc building regulations. They stipulate minimum legal levels of
energy efﬁciency performance for different types of buildings. The Code
for Sustainable Homes also provides a single national standard for the
design and construction of sustainable new homes, ranging from grades
1 to 6. Highly energy efﬁcient properties with on-site low-carbon
energy generation typically score highly in the energy category. It is
predominantly a voluntary scheme but is enforceable where: (1) the
level 3 energy standard is now incorporated in the building regulations,
(2) if the Local Authority require developers to comply with the code by
including a requirement in their planning policy or (3) if it is affordable
housing is funded by the Homes and Community Agency that requires
homes to be built to code level 3 (DCLG, 2014).
Under development are the ‘zero carbon’ homes regulations that
stipulate the requirement for net carbon emissions from the regulated
energy use (i.e. space heating and cooling, hot water, lighting and
ventilation) associatedwith new residential developments will required
to zero by 2016, with new commercial developments following suit in
2019. It is proposed that this target could be met by a combination of:
(1) fabric energy efﬁciency, (2) on-site low carbon heat & power and (3)
off-site allowable solutions (Zero Carbon Hub, 2013)
Raised energy efﬁciency
standards for buildings, which
ESCos can help achieve
3
Economic incentives
Low-carbon energy generation
ﬁnancial incentives
(e.g. Renewable Heat Incentive
(RHI) & Feed-in-Tariff (FiT))
The FiT scheme began in 2010 and provides a long-term revenue stream
and is much more focused on supporting small to medium-scale,
decentralised generation of low-carbon electricity. A generation tariff is
available for each unit of electricity generated, which is dependent on
the form of generation, whilst an export tariff is available for the sale of
excess electricity to the grid (DECC, 2012b).
The RHI is similar to the FiT but instead provides generators with a long-
term revenue stream for the small to medium scale generation of low-
carbon heat (DECC, 2013). It commenced in 2011 for domestic
properties and 2014 for commercial.
Provide a reliable, long-term
revenue stream for ESCos
16
(continued on next page)
(continued )
Policies Description of policy Policy's inﬂuence on ESCo
model
Nos. of
interviewees
who cited policy
driver (n ¼ 43)
Grant schemes for low-carbon
energy projects
Low-carbon capital grant schemes offer energy consumers and some
small energy companies with one-off payments to subsidies the
installation and running costs for energy equipment that meets speciﬁc
energy efﬁciency and/or renewable energy standards. One ongoing
scheme is the Renewable Heat Premium Payment, and two recent
schemes are the Low Carbon Buildings Programme and the
Microgeneration Certiﬁcation Scheme.
Made upfront capital available
for delivering energy service
projects
9
Direct public sector purchasing
London's RE:FIT procurement
framework
Greater London Authority (GLA) introduced the RE:FIT procurement
framework, which streamlines the procurement process for energy
services by providing pre-negotiated, EU-regulation compliant
framework contracts through which a group of prequaliﬁed ESCos can
undertake the design and implementation of energy conservation
measures (GLA, 2013).
Streamlined energy service
contract procurement
5
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